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Routes of Intervention and Rates
of Movement

1. The transportation routes in the southern part of China and the most likely routes of Chinese military intervention into Southeast Asia are depicted on this map (pointing). These are the road, rail and water-way routes in this part of China and those which lead from the southern border of China to Burma, Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam.

2. Early warning of Chinese military intentions toward Southeast Asia is extremely important. Several weeks [redacted] will supply) will be required to organize and deploy forces within China for an invasion of Southeast Asia. But after troops have been deployed and loaded in vehicles at these access points along the southern border of China, we estimate that within 3 to 7 days some 35 light infantry divisions and supporting units - about 630,000 men - could move deep into Southeast Asia. In this time they could be deployed along a line extending from Meiktila, Burma (10 divisions); Muang Chiang Rai, Thailand (7 divisions); Vientiane (2 divisions); Pak Sane (2 divisions) and Savannakhet (6 divisions) Laos, and to the Demilitarized Zone (8 divisions) between South and North Vietnam.

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3. This rapid rate of advance assumes, optimum conditions for military operations such as no opposition, dry weather and excellent organization. If, however, the Chinese were to make these moves only during darkness in order to attempt to avoid detection, the time required to arrive at the objectives would be at least 4 times greater or from about 15 days to a month.

4. In view of this capability on the part of the Chinese, it is essential that intelligence be able to provide valid indicators of Chinese military intentions. Our Government needs as much lead time as possible to adopt measures which will prevent or retard the exercise of this very considerable Chinese military capability.

